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TRADE REGULATION: VERTICAL TERRITORIAL
RESTRICTIONS UPHELD BY SEVENTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR YEARS manufacturers have submitted without litigation to the
Government's position that vertical territorial restrictions are il-
legal per se. In 1963, however, the Supreme Court refused to accept
this per se doctrine.1 That ruling was interpreted in Snap-On Tools
Corp. v. FTC,2 where the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld a system of vertical territorial restrictions.
A vertical territorial restriction generally consists of a promise by
a dealer that he will sell the goods he buys from a manufacturer
neither outside an area specified by the manufacturer nor to
customers who reside or have their place of business outside that
area.3 It is usually connected with and strengthens an exclusive
franchise.4 Such restrictions help manufacturers to obtain capable
dealers5 and to discourage them from handling competing lines.0
Moreover, the orderly distribution of goods and the determination
of dealers' requirements in advance are facilitated.7  In addition,
dealers are required to develop the entire sales potential of their
territory rather than go into another's territory8 On the other
1 white Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
2 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
3 A violation of this promise by the dealer, known as cross-selling, is penalized by
a system of after-the-fact sanctions called profit pass-overs. The profit pass-over
requires the dealer who sells to a customer from outside his territory to pay to the
dealer from whose territory the customer came a certain sum of money fixed by the
manufacturer. Note, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 795, 809, 814 (1962). See generally Jordan,
Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 111
(1962); Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1960).
'"[T]he systematic granting of franchises with exclusive selling rights necessarily
involves reciprocal restrictions on the grantor and the grantee of the franchise. The
restriction on the freedom of the dealer to sell outside the assigned territory is
necessary in order to make effective the granting of exclusive selling rights to others."
Jordan, supra note 3, at 142.
5 In order to persuade a desirable individual to make the investment and take
the risk connected with a dealership, the manufacturer often must assure the dealer
that he will be the exclusive dealer for the manufacturer's products within the
granted territory. Note, supra note 3, at 805-09.
1 See Jordan, supra note 3, at 122.7 See Note, supra note 3, at 805, 813.
s Businessmen say that without vertical territorial restrictions, a dealer would be
tempted to encroach on the best of a neighboring dealer's customers rather than
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hand, vertical territorial restrictions necessarily result in the elimina-
tion of intrabrand competition. Hence, the consumer is deprived
of any competitive advantage, in prices or services, that he might
gain if he were able to bargain with more than one dealer.9
Territorial restrictions were first considered by courts in hori-
zontal form: the division of markets by competitors. Such hori-
zontal division of territories has been held to be illegal per se both
at common law and under section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.'0 Because the anticompetitive intent in this device is clear,
the courts have held possible economic justification to be irrele-
vant.' . On the other hand, when vertical territorial restrictions
first came before the courts they were upheld.12 Nevertheless, in
the past two decades, manufacturers, believing such restrictions
to be illegal per se, have submitted to consent judgments whenever
challenged.13 A permissive provision in these consent judgments,
develop the more difficult customers in his own territory. This would result in
considerably less total sales for the manufacturer. Note, supra note 3, at 811.
' White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 278 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
1026 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (agreement to divide territories by producers
of antifriction bearings); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), decree modified and judgment aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (agreement
to divide territories by iron pipe manufacturers).
11 "[T]he range of restrictive agreements under consideration in this section covers
just those antitrust offenses which are described as being illegal per se and in respect
to which, in consequence, no evidence of economic justification is admissible. This
situation is simply another reflection of the primacy of the political over the
economic motivation of antitrust; agreements between competitors create economic
power which may be abused, and this is thought undesirable even if it should also
yield economic advantages. But it also reflects the fact that the courts themselves
have always opposed the idea that they should attempt to assess the economic balance
of advantage. Economic argument, even of the simplest kind, tends to be seen as a
slippery slope on which the firm footing needed for a properly justiciable issue cannot
be obtained. Once any such argument is admitted.., there will be nothing to
prevent the introduction of more and more subtle economic arguments. The strongest
judicial tradition in antitrust is that which disclaims any competence in weighing
these arguments and denies that any case-by-case assessment of the public interest
in the light of them is or ought to be required by the law." NEATr, THE ANTRUrST
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATEs OF AMERICA 427-28 (1960). See also cases cited note 10
supra.
'1 See, e.g., Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903);
Johnson v. Franklin Kirk Co., 83 Ind. App. 519, 148 N.E. 177 (1925). In the Phillips
case a single vertical territorial restriction was upheld on the ground that its purpose
was to promote the business of the manufacturer and its effect on competition
was indirect and immaterial. In the Johnson case a system of vertical territorial restric-
tions was upheld on the ground that such agreements are not against public policy
because a manufacturer has a right to control its output.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Lone Star Cadillac Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade
Cas.) 70739, at 77918 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 1963) (distributor of automobiles); United
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however, has allowed the use of areas of primary responsibility.1 4
Under this arrangement dealers are assigned an area which they
must fully develop and service.
Recently, however, the White Motor Company refused to submit
to such a consent judgment. This company is a manufacturer of
trucks and truck parts and sells to dealers for resale. To effectuate
its sales policy, the company enters into contracts with its dealers
and distributors which require them to sell only to customers who
live or whose place of business is in a specified area. White Motor
Company contended that this was the only feasible system available
which would enable it to compete against the larger companies in
the field. Irrespective of this argument, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals held the territorial restrictions to be illegal per se.
However, the Supreme Court, because not enough was known about
the actual impact of this type of restriction, refused to set down an
illegal per se rule.15 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority,
rejected Government arguments analogizing vertical to horizontal
territorial restrictions. He reasoned that it might be shown that the
purpose and effect of vertical territorial restrictions are legitimate,
as opposed to horizontal territorial restrictions which may never
have any other purpose than the stifling of competition.' 0 The
rationale appears to be that vertical territorial restrictions may be
upheld if circumstances necessitate their use.17 The Court did not
foreclose the possibility, however, that an illegal per se rule might
be adopted as to these restrictions should they prove to have too great
States v. American Type Founders Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) 69065,
at 74203 (D.N.J. June 20, 1958) (manufacturer of printing presses); United States
v. J. P. Seeburg Corp., TRADE REG. REP'. (1957 Trade Cas.) 68613, at 72476 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 31, 1957) (manufacturer of coin-operated phonograph machines).
The Department of Justice started its attack on vertical territorial restrictions in
1948, taking the position that such restrictions were illegal per se. It first applied
pressure to the large automobile manufacturers and was able to convince them to
remove voluntarily such restrictions from their dealer and distributor contracts.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing Legislation of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 361-65
(1956).
1" See cases cited note 13 supra.
15 372 U.S. at 261, 263.
1o"Id. at 263.
17 Some of the inquiries that should be made in evaluating the impact 'and in
determining the legality of the vertical territorial restriction are: what relationship
does the restraint bear to the ultimate survival of the manufacturer, is the restraint
more restrictive than necessary, and are there any adequate alternatives that would
satisfy the manufacturer's needs? 372 U.S. at 268-72 (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 1964: 408
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an effect on competition.'8 A strong dissent, rejecting any argument
of business necessity, urged the adoption of an illegal per se rule.19
Snap-On Tools is the first consideration of a vertical territorial
restriction in the light of White Motor Co.20 Snap-On is a large
manufacturer of a complete line of hand tools and related equip-
ment. It does most of its business through independent dealers who
work out of mobile walk-in trucks and who regularly call on and
service mechanics, automotive service, and industrial establish-
ments. The dealers have an exclusive franchise subject to Snap-On's
right to sell to certain industrial customers. Snap-On requires its
dealers to enter into a standard form contract which includes ter-
ritorial restrictions, resale price provisions, customer limitations, and
restrictions on the right of the dealer to compete after ceasing to be
a dealer.21 After hearing the evidence, the hearing examiner dis-
missed the complaint against Snap-On.22 The Federal Trade Com-
mission reversed on the ground that Snap-On's over-all distribution
plan was an unfair method of competition in violation of section 5
18 "We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrange-
ments on competition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on
competition and lack... any redeeming virtue'.., and therefore should be classified
as per se violations of the Sherman Act." 372 U.S. at 263.
"An explicit agreement to limit competition has never been justified by the
existence of interbrand competition. If dealers could not agree among themselves to
divide territories, a manufacturer should not fare any better with a plan to achieve
the same result. 372 U.S. at 278-80 (Clark, J., dissenting).
"°The Supreme Court in White Motor Co. reversed the summary judgment
granted the Government by the district court but did not intimate any view on the
merits. The case was remanded for a trial on the merits to determine the legality
of the vertical territorial restrictions therein, in accord with the reasoning of the
Court. 372 U.S. at 264.
21The "Dealer Agreement" contained among others the following agreements and
conditions:
1. The dealer agrees that he will not sell any of the products purchased from
Snap-On at a price varying from the retail price fixed by Snap-On.
2. The dealer will sell Snap-On's products only within the geographical limits of
the territory described in his agreement.
3. The dealer will not sell Snap-On's products to the certain persons or firms
specified by name in his agreement.
4. The "Dealer Agreement" may be terminated by the company at any time, and
at the termination of the agreement, whether by the dealer or by Snap-On, the dealer
agrees that he will not engage in a similar business within the state in which he had
been selling Snap-On's products for one year after the termination of the "Dealer
Agreement." 321 F.2d at 827 n.2.
s- The hearing examiner when he first heard the evidence considered separately
the legality of the restrictive provisions of Snap-On's dealer contract. He dismissed
the complaint as to the vertical territorial restrictions and the customer limitations.
The Federal Trade Commission vacated this order and ordered the hearing examiner
to consider whether the over-all distribution plan constituted an unlawful restraint
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of the Federal Trade Commission Act.23  The Court of Appeals,
in reversing the Commission, held that the restrictive provisions of
the contract should not be considered as a unitary device to restrain
competition, but that each restraint should be considered indi-
vidually. Consequently, the court found there to be no substantial
basis for the Commission's finding that the restraints were illegal. 2'
Furthermore, relying on White Motor Co., the court reasoned that
as the vertical territorial restrictions promoted broad meaningful
interbrand competition, a minimal curtailment of intrabrand com-
petition was justified.25  Moreover, the court rejected areas of
primary responsibility as an adequate alternative to the vertical
territorial restrictions reasoning that, because Snap-On permitted
the dealers to sell to any customer as long as the customer bought
within the dealer's territory, there was but a difference in words
between the two. 26
Superficially, this reasoning complies with the principles set
down by the Supreme Court in White Motor Co. However, its
conclusion should be examined in terms of the attendant economic
and business circumstances. The court stressed the fact that Snap-On
allowed its dealers to sell to customers from any territory, as long
as the sale was made within the territory of the dealer. In some
businesses, such as that of White Motor, this would be an im-
portant limitation on vertical territorial restrictions, but in Snap-
on competition. Upon again hearing the evidence, the hearing examiner made
findings of fact and dismissed the complaint. 321 F.2d at 828.
23"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in comnierce, are declared unlawful." 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.s.c. §
45 (a) (1) (1958).
24As to the price restriction, the court found that Snap-On was attempting in
good faith to comply with the law and that its activity should not be struck down
as illegal on the basis of a technical and literal interpretation of the contract. 321
F.2d at 833-35.
The court found that the customer restrictions, at most, amounted to a de
minimus restraint on competition. Id. at 835-36.
The court said that the restrictions on the dealer after termination of the
"Dealer Agreement" might be unreasonable as to the size of the territory involved
but as this provision was very rarely enforced and has since been deleted from the
"Dealer Agreement" there was no need for a cease and desist order. Id. at 836-37.
2"[Tlhe trial examiner discussed the facts fully, and demonstrated by them to
his satisfaction, and to ours, that there are certain advantages to a manufacturer,
such as petitioner, in requiring an exclusive territorial arrangement with its dealers
which promotes (rather than supresses) in a broad, meaningful way, competition
between it and other manufacturers of similar products, and which therefore justify
a minimal curtailment of intrabrand competition among its dealers." 321 F.2d at
831-32.
20 Id. at 832.
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On's situation this limitation is meaningless. There the customer
does not call on the dealer; rather the dealer calls on and sells to
the customer at the latter's place of business. Moreover, despite
what the court said, there is more than a mere difference in words
between the area of primary responsibility and the vertical terri-
torial restrictions employed by Snap-On.27  Under the former when
a dealer has fully developed and serviced his territory he might
solicit customers from outside his territory, whereas, under the latter,
the dealer is never permitted to sell outside his territory.28 Even
though the court said that anything less than the particular vertical
territorial restrictions employed would produce friction among the
dealers,29 this would seem to be no more than the normal friction
that exists among competitors. It is this very friction that the anti-
trust laws require for the protection of the consumer.8 0
Although the effect on intrabrand competition is characterized
by the court as minimal, realistically the net purpose and effect of
the vertical restriction, in conjunction with the exclusive franchise,
is to eliminate intrabrand competition.31 On the other hand, the
court places particular emphasis on the justification that this type
of restriction promotes interbrand competition. Conspicuously
lacking, however, is an examination of the resulting interbrand
competition in the absence of such a restriction. In this context,
an important consideration is how the ultimate survival of Snap-On,
and others similarly situated, would be affected if vertical territorial
restrictions were not permitted.32
General considerations would suggest that the ultimate survival
of Snap-On would not be substantially affected by not permitting
-7 Mr. Justice Brennan (citing Snap-On Tools Corp., TRADE REG. REt. (1961-1963
Transfer Binder; FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 15546, at 20414 (FTC
Docket No. 7116, Nov. 1, 1961) as support) suggested the area of primary responsibility
as a less restrictive alternative and a lawful means of serving the legitimate needs
of a manufacturer. 372 U.S. at 271 n.12.
28 Actually, the dealer can sell outside his territory by breaching his agreement
with the manufacturer and paying the profit pass-over penalty. Therefore, the
real barrier is no greater than the profit pass-over, which may vary from business
to business, as it is the manufacturer who sets the amount of the profit pass-over.
Note, supra note 3, at 827-29.
o 321 F.2d at 832.
30"The general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in
open markets." Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Coa!m. ANnTusr REP. 1 (1955).
3' This was admitted to be the purpose and effect by counsel for Snap-On during
the hearing. Brief for Respondent, pp. 21-23.
2 See note 17 supra.
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vertical territorial restrictions. 3 Initially it is important to consider
that Snap-On is one of the larger competitors in the hand tool busi-
ness.34 Moreover, there was no finding by the court that the com-
petitors of Snap-On were permitted to use, or did use, vertical
territorial restrictions. Consequently, it does not seem likely that
Snap-On would be submerged if put on an even footing with its
competitors. A more plausible conclusion would be that Snap-On
would continue as a strong competitor in its field and on a more
equitable basis.
By making justification of vertical territorial restrictions relative-
ly easy, Snap-On Tools extends White Motor Co. beyond its in-
tended limits.3 5 This non-discriminating analysis could lead to
either of two undesirable extremes. It could be a basis for justifying
almost all such restrictions, or it could lead the Supreme Court to
lay down an illegal per se rule banning all vertical restrictions.30 A
stricter economic analysis is called for; vertical territorial restrictions
should be justified only when it is shown that they are necessary for
survival, that they promote interbrand competition, and that there
are no adequate alternatives.
33 At any rate, Snap-On would be permitted to use the area of primary responsi-
bility, and this, connected with an exclusive franchise, should prove efficient in the
-development and servicing of the assigned areas. Note, supra note 3, at 828-29.
4 Snap-On has 50 branch offices in principal cities of the United States, Canada,
Mexico, and Puerto Rico. Its net sales have increased from $16 million in
1951 to $24 million in 1957. Snap-On is among the six top tool firms in the
country according to testimony of its sales vice president. Brief for Respondent, pp.
7-8.
" See text accompanying note 17 supra.
"'See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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